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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DOROTHY STEVENSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 9529

vs.
VERNON L. STEVENSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S PETrTI'O'N FOR RE'HEARING
AND SU'PPOR'TTNG BRIEF.
Vernon L. Stevenson, the Defendant and Respondent in the above entitled matter, by and through
his attorneys of record herein, pursuant to Rule
76 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully
petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in
the above entitled cause upon the following grounds:
The decision is erroneous in that :i't assumes
the testimony of the plain tiff concerning specific
acts of cruelty 'allegedly committed by defendant
was undisputed.
1.

2.

The decision negates the long established
1
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principle that the decision of the trial judge is presumptively correct and should be affirmed unless
the findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence indicating an abuse of discretion.
3. The decision constitutes "judicial legislation" and in effect abrogates the statute by making
incompatibility a grounds for divorce.
!The attached Affidavit shows the existence
of new evidence which adversely affects the credibility of the plaintiff and if the decision of the
lower court is reversed the case should be sent
back for a new trial in order to permit the defendant
to assert an additional defense.
4.

WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that a
rehearing be granted, that the court re-examine the
facts and the law and that the judgment of the trial
court be raffirmed, or in the alternative, the case
be returned for a new trial in order to permit the
defendant to assert a new defense.
HANSON AND BAIJDWIN and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
By-----------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
5t5 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
2
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I hereby certify that I am one of the counsel
for Respondent, petitioner herein, and tha;t in my
opinion there is good cause to believe the judgment
objected to is erroneous and th'at the case ought to
be re-examined as prayed in the Petition, and that
this Petition is not filed for the purpose of delay or
to otherwise hinder the prosecution of this action.
HANSON AND BALDWIN and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
By-----------------------------------------------------------Rex J. Hanson
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
POrNT I
THE DECISION 'IS ERRONEOUS IN TH'AT IT ASSUMES THE TESTIMONY OF 'THE PLAINTIFF CONCERNING SPECIFIC .A:CTS OF CRUELTY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY DE·FENDANT WAS UNDISPUTED.

'The opinion

~states:

"In the instant case, there was evidence that
Dr. Stevenson not only required 'Mrs. Stevenson to
assume almost complete responsibility for the maintenance of the house and yard, but she also had
to submit to every whim and desire of her husband.
For example, Mrs. Stevenson testified that at night
after she had retired, she was required to answer
'all of the doctor's phone calls, was required to get
him drinks of water, and when he had to make a
night call she would get out of bed and move her
car from the driveway. In one instance she did all
the work when they were moving to a new home,
while the defendant merely stood by and watched.
The veracity of this testimony was not denied by
the defendant. He merely cl'aimed that Mrs. Stevenson had acted in this manner because of here 'spirit
of cooperation'."
In stating that "the veracity of this testimony
was not denied" it isn't clear whether the court
is referring to the specific conduct of the defendant enumerated or whether the court is of the opinion
that there was no denial by defendant of any of the
testimony given by pl'aintiff in support of her charge
of mental cruelty. We submit tha't the testimony
4
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was in substantial conflict on all of the evidence adduced by plain tiff on this issue. True, the plain tiff
assumed the responsibility of maintaining the home
and yard, not because she had to but because she
wanted to. Her testimony on cross-examination is
quoted verbatim as follows:
"Q. You talked about the gardening, house,
painting - did you ever have 'a hired gardener to take care of the grounds around the
house there?
A. Yes.
Q. There was a hired gardener?
A. Not a hired gardener in the last few
years, I found a handyman, I used to have
a cleaning woman, she could get half way
through that hig house on Friday. I said if I
let the cleaning woman go will you get a
handyman?
Q. Were you there the summer before and
had a handyman?
A. I fired him.
Q. You fired him?
A. I didn't feel he was doing the work. The
summer before we came back I hired Otto,
he came once a week to mow the lawns and
eli p the hedge.
Q. Was there any enjoyment in this gardening?
A. It used to be I loved to garden and raise
beautiful plants." (R. 68-69)

*

*

*

"Q. Did you make any attempt to hire a
cleaning woman?
5
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A. No sir, I didn't attempt.
Q. So you handled all this yourself.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that a source of irritation to you?
A. No.
Q. Did you feel Dr. Stevenson expected you
to do this?
A. Yes, I am not irritated, I expected to
clean the house.
Q. That big house, as big as it was?
A. Yes.
Q. It is two stories or is it three?
A. Three, a basement rumpus room." ( R.
70)

The defendant's testimony on this aspect is
as follows:
"Q. What 'about gardening, was there one
em played to do the gardening around the
place?
A. As we went through it this morning, we
have had someone to help with the gardening
the last number of years.
Q. Have you ever refused to permit her to
have a gardener?
A. No, sir.
Q. What about the cleaning woman in the
house, h'ave you refused to have a cleaning
woman around?
A. No.
6
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Q. Are there times she didn't want a cleaning woman around there?
A. That is correct, that was her prerogative.
Q. What about having adequate appli'ances
to take care of the house, did you deny that
right?
A. That never has been denied. There is a
dishwasher, a freezer, a range and 'a refrigerator." (R. t22)
On cross-examination the plaintiff testified
about the requirement that she answer the defendant's telephone calls as follows:
"Q. You spoke about phone calls, there were
times when Dr. Stevenson came home after
an emergency and said that he was tired out?
A. There were times, yes.
Q. You felt he should get his rest?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't resent doing that at those
times, did you, Mrs. Stevenson?
A. No." (R. 76)
On this subject the defendant testified as follows:
"Q. Now, at times in your practice, were
you required to come home late at night?
A. That is part of the surgical practice, I
- when an emergency comes up like an appendix, an acute appendix, or an acute case,
there is a great deal of work during the night.
Q. And so far as answering the phone, did
Mrs. Stevenson answer the phone - was
7
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that to protect you when you came in late at
night?
A. She did it and very often she would say,
'I am going to S'Creen these .calls, if it is something that can wait until morning I will do
it.'" (R. 123)
"Q. Is it true the telephone in your bedroom
stood on your side of the Bed?
A. That is correct.
Q. Isn't it true for Mrs. Stevenson to answer
it she will have to get out of bed 'and walk
all the way around the bed?
A. No, that isn't necessary, it is available
by passing it over.
Q. You would hand the phone over to her
to answer it?
A. That is at her express desire. When I
would work hard it was her desire for her to
do that." (R. 148)
Regarding the testimony that plaintiff was
required to perform her household duties while suffering from a herniated intervertebral disc the defendant testified:
"Q. Doctor, there has been some talk about
a physical condition, some talk about a disc
condition, and testimony - she testified I am not sure of this - getting out of bed
quickly, do you have your version about that?
A. I don't recall- that is contrary to medical practice to do anything like that, I know,
that is my recollection.
Q. Did you diagnose any treatment?
A. We took a trip, stopped off at Omaha,
8
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saw one of the best neurological surgeons in
America, Dr. Keeting in Omaha, to do a complete neurological work at that time, that
was ~about 1951." (R. 1'25)
"Q. Do you recall when your wife had the
back condition and she didn't have medical
attention and had to push a chair to walk?
A. Mr. Hanson, she has had all the medication, certainly she was helped with consideration and medication, and during our stay in
Omaha did everything that could be done."
(R. 244)
The word "paranoid" is a medical term describing someone suffering from !a persecution complex,
(not an unusual experience of people considered
normal in every respect) , the record does not support the assertion that the defendant charged the
plaintiff with being mentally disordered. He did
contend that the sudden deterioration of their marriage and her subsequent conduct indicated she was
undergoing an emotional change. On cross-examination he testified:
"Q. During this period of time you told her
you thought there was some kind of a men'tal
problem?
A. I said it was an emotional problem, I did
not say mental problem to 'Mrs. Stevenson."
(R. 1'51)
On direct examination he described the plaintiff's attitude after they had returned from the
trip to Mazatlan, Mexico:
9
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"Q. What was your relationship after you
returned from that trip with Mrs. Stevenson?
A. For the first time the real communication
broke down. We weren't 'able to say, ''Honey,
let's do this or do that." I noticed Mrs. Stevenson had become more depressed and almost
one of melancholia. That she didn't feel she
wanted to go out with me, to the hospital,
perhaps at my invitation while I was making
my rounds. She didn't want to do 'anything
that we ordinarily did. Our friends and our
bridge club and our clubs suffered in that
we didn't have the communication that we
had before.
Q. Did you suggest to her during that period
that, after your return from Mexico, maybe
she should have medical attention or care?
A. I suggested it on several occasions. I did
it in this way, I said, "Honey, let's have a
doctor see what it is, you are losing weight"
- this I didn't like. She had no color, and
was tired. I said, '·'Let's have Dr. Hicken look
at you." This time when we went back to
Omaha she said, ''I need no medical care, I
won't receive any.
Q. What effect did this have on her?
A. This, for the first time in her life, caused
here to become aggressive, she would not do
that." '(R. 127)
Q. What efforts have you made, Dr. Stevenson, to reconcile your marriage since Mrs.
Stevenson left the second time?
A. I h~ave made every effort to get to the
basic problem of why a marriage should suddenly deteriorate.
In my practice, I am ndt an authority,
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

but I do see this problem in this age of marriage. She was 4 7, there is a syndrome recognized all over the world known as a misnomer or nonentity, it is called involution of
melancholia of the menopause, it is an accepted term in every medical school." ( R.
12'9)

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Q. Do you feel a divorce is the answer to
your problem between you and Mrs. Stevenson?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Why don't you?
A. Because I believe this is a problem that
can 'be treated medically. I feel it is a category
that has no more stigma than diabetes, or any
other illness that can be ta'ken care of, we
know it has been done and we know it is successful." ( R. 141 )
"Q. Dr. Stevenson, have you ever told Mrs.
Stevenson, or anyone else, she was insane?
A. No, I have never said that." (R. 138)
The following tes'timony of plaintiff is indicative that she had a tendency towards a persecution
complex:
"Q. There are many things you did which
you felt Dr. Stevenson expected even though
there was no request of him?
A. I think that would be true in any marriage.
Q. You did it in your marriage?
A. Yes.
Q. When you did it you had a feeling of
resentment towards him, didn't you?
11
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A. Certainly.'' ( R. 7'5)
Plaintiff's testimony lends some credence that
she was experiencing the menopausal change.
"Q. Mrs. Stevenson, there has been some
reference during the trial to the menopause,
I will ask you whether or not you are still
having menstrual periods?
A. Yes sir, I am.
Q. Is that on a regular basis?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Have you experienced any hot flashes?
A. Possibly three over the past three years,
that is if they are true ones." (R. 233)
The defendant emphatically denied that he had
ever accused the plaintiff of being unfaithful to him.
"Q. You have heard the testimony this morning, Doctor, I hesitate to open wounds and
get in this matter, but as long as counsel
raised it I have no alternative - have you
ever accused Mrs. Stevenson.
A. Mr. Hanson, I have never. I will state
I wouldn't be here today if I had.
This is not old wounds, this is something
that has been brought up this morning. I
wasn't even cognizant of this. This one incident was recalled at 'the deposition, that was
explained. I have never accused my wife of
anything, I have no recollection, on any of
these other occasions of ever accusing my wife
because that never has happened- and I love
her.
Q. Maybe the court might be interested in
this urinary infection you have, will you give
your version of that.
12
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A. This happens quite frequently, in a hospital they catheterize the first twenty-four
or forty-eight hours for a number of causes,
in~abili ty to void, and there was an infection
in the urinary tract that developed.
Q. Did you ever blame Mrs. Stevenson for
that?
A. I never, I know I didn't ·(R. 245)
The court is mistaken in the assertion that
plaintiff underwent a series of psychological tests
given by Dr. Branch. She saw Dr. Branch only
once ( R. 34). The psychological tests were given
by Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist. On cross-examination Dr. Korner admitted there is ~a gray area
between normalcy and abnormalcy ( R. '172), that
most people during their lives cross into the gray
area and return. Dr. Nelson said there were neurological factors which played a part in the plaintiff's
decision to terminate the marriage (R. 212). Dr.
Brown admitted on cross-examination that he had
suggested medical hypnosis to plaintiff which she
had refused ( R. 131) .
1

Certainly the tri'al court could weigh the testimony of these medical men in the light of their
cross-examination and the ·circumstances that plaintiff had obtained their services under compulsion
We submit that the testimony of the defendant that
the marriage of the parties was ideal until it suddenly deteriorate three years before the action was
13
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filed was credible considering the evidence in its
entirety and apparently was 'believed 'by the trial
court. If the defendant did not deny with specific
exactitude every incident testified to by the plaintiff, his testimony certainly constituted !a general
denial. What man ·could remember incidents or difficulties with his wife which occurred twenty-five
years earlier ('before the children were born)? In
fact, a person who would remember these incidents
with resentment might well be considered unusual.
The defendant testified that his family was wonderfully close-knit; that the family loved each other
and the children loved their fa:ther and mother; that
in the family relationship they enjoyed the holidays
of Thanksgiving and Christmas. Three years ago at
Christmas the pl'aintiff gave him a movie camera
with this remark, ''We are going to give you 'a gift
for once tha't is appropriate" (R. '123) This test1mony was not denied by Mrs. Stevenson.
POINT I'I
THE DECISION NEGATES THE LONG ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE IS PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AND
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE FINDINGS
ARE CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE INDICATING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The long established principle which has guided
this Court in reviewing the decisions of the trial
court in equity matters has been given frequent
14
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expression in the cases. This princi pie was announced in the following language:
''The more recent pronouncements of
this Court and the policies to which we adhere
are to the effect that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in such rna tters, and his judgment should not be changed
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it worked
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Wilson
vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977.
1

Similar language appears in the case of M cDonald vs. McDonald, 120 Utah ·57~3, 236 P. 2d
1006.
"We adhere to the qualifications set forth
in the more recent expressions of this court;
that the judgment will not he disturbed unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against
the findings of the trial court; where there
has been a plain abuse of discretion or where
a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought."
This court has recognized the advantage the
trial court has in observing and testing the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony.
And ''. . . unless on the record it is shown, . · . .
that the finding is so cleary against the weight of
evidence as to show error, the trial court's findings
are to be upheld." Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158
P. 781.
The substitution by this court of its judgment
for that of the trial court in divorce cases is not
1.5
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limitless and should occur only where the first decision is clearly erroneous.
"In some cases we have used language to
the effect that an appeal in a divorce case is
in effect trial de novo in this court. Hendricks
vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 6'3 P. 2d 277.
The language would seem to imply that in a
divorce case, even more than in an equity case,
we will make our decision independently of
the findings of the lower court. Even in an
equity case, we do not overturn the judgment
unless it is fairly against the preponderance
of the evidence. The writer believes that every
intendment should be in favor of the trial
court, for not only does he in a divorce case
have the parties before him, enabling him to
test crediiblity by demeanor, but the conduct
and m'anner of the parties in the court room
sometimes gives much aid in solving who
really is at fault. Moreover, a trial judge may
'live with' a divorce proceeding in its preliminary stages and know it from angles
which the record does not disclose." Pinion
vs. Pinion, 9'2 Utah 255, 262.
The decision reversing the tri~al court fails to
follow this principle. The testimony upon which the
plaintiff has relied as grounds for divorce was in
sharp dispute. Neither facts nor circumstances appear in the record, and none are referred to in the
opinion, indicating that the trial judge clearly abused
his discretion in making the findings on materi'al
issues respecting the evidence which was in conflict. The opinion does not accord the trial court
16
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the "considerable latitude of discretion" which the
law allows him. His judgment has been overturned
without any showing of "clear abuse" of his discretionary powers.
Even though this court may be "greatly inclined" to a view contrary to that of the trial court,
such is "far from holding tha:t the trial court abused
its discretion vested in it by law, and unless we can
say that it is clear that it did, then its judgment
and not ours must prevail." Sharp vs. Gianulakis,
63 Utah 249, 225 P. 387. See also Rowe vs. Rowe,
12 Utah '2d 291, 365 P. 2d 79'7.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence
of this case does not clearly show that the trial court
abused its discretion and it was error to reverse
that judgment.
POINT III
THE DECISION CONSTITUTES "J U'DICIAL LEGISLATION" AND IN EFFECT ABROGATES THE
STATUTE BY MAKING INCOMPATI BILITY A
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE.
1

1

The grounds for divorce which are now contained in Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-1 (1953 as
amended), have in substance been a part of the
statutory law of Utah since 1888. The right to receive a divorce in Utah must necessarily be brought
within the provisions of this !section. The granting
of a decree of divorce under the facts of this case
17
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has the effect of making incompatibility of the
parties ~a ground for divorce.
The recent case of Curry vs.. Curry, 7 Utah 2d
19'8, 200, 3'21 P. 2d 939, dealt specifically with this:
" ... there must exist grounds for a divorce sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of our statute, which specifies cruelty to the
extent of causing great mental distress."
Loose language in any of the cases :
". . . cannot properly be tortured in to
holding that a divorce should be granted where
spouses are unable to live harmoniously together where the grounds are sufficient to
meet the requirements of our statute are made
out or not."
This Court vacated the trial court's judgment
granting a divorce to the plaintiff in the case of
Holman vs. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 303, 304, 72
P. 2d 829, in the following language :
"The court well remarked that it seemed
useless to keep these two young people together. There seemed to 'be insufficient provocation to grant the defendant the divorce
so he chivalrously granted it to plaintiff. But
the legislature has laid down grounds on
which divorce may be granted. They must be
present. The mere drifting apart because of
failure to synchronize interests or ambition
is no ground for a divorce although it may be
that the parties cannot and should not be compelled to live together." (Emphasis supplied.)
The mere fact that a marriage relationship
18
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has deteriorated to a point where its continuance
is not satisfactory to one or both of the parties is
not a legal basis upon which to base a decree divorcing the parties.
"It is not enough that they both desire
a divorce or refuse to live with each other.
Courts are not authorized to grant divorces
except on the particular causes prescribed
by 1~aw and then only when the grounds or
cause for divorce is proved by substantial and
satisfactory evidence." Hyrup vs. Hyrup, 67
Utah 580,245 Pac. 235.
Torturing the facts present in this case into
cruel treatment causing great mental distress avoids
the legislature limitations placed upon the courts
in these m~atters. When the express declarations of
a legislative body are nullified by "interpretation"
such becomes judicial ligislation rather than judicial construction.
Much of plaintiff's evidence introduced in support of her complaint is picayunish. Some of the
evidence referred to in the opinion of the court concerns matters which occurred '25 to '27 years ago.
Obviously the parties had adjusted these problems
'and had lived a normal married life during all this
time. The recitation of minor differences which
have occurred over a long married life should be
considered in light of the circumstances at the time
they occurred. This Court should not encourage the
timeless accumulation of such matters and permit
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them to hang as a Sword of Damocles over the stability and sanctity of !a marriage. If a trivial matter does not constitute a ground for divorce at the
time it occurred, surely the law should not magnify its importance and give it greater legal dignity because of the mere passage of time.
Although minor difficulties may cause the parties to become incompatible through loss of patience
'and understanding for each other, such was not intended by the legislature (and as previously recognized by this Court), to constitute cruel, inhuman
treatment causing great mental distress. An interpretation of the statute, which in effect permits and
sanctions a divorce on such a basis, is "'judicial
legislation" because !a ground wholly foreign to the
statute is introduced.
POINT IV
THE A'TTACHED AFFIDAVIT SHOWS THE EXISTENCE OF NE,W EVI'DE NCE WHICH ADVERSELY
AFFECTS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND IF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS
REVERSED THE CASE SHOULD BE SENT 'BACK FOR
A NEW TRIAL IN ORDER 'TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO ASSERT AN ADDITIONAL DEFENSE.
1

As shown by the affidavit of defendant, which
is set out as Appendix "A", he did not discover the
letter referred to therein until August 9, 1961, which
was after the plaintiff had appealed the trial court's
decision. (The letter is set out in Appendix "B".)
Inasmuch as the trial judge had denied the divorce
20
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there was no reason to remit the case back to the
District Court for further introduction of evidence.
The reason for attaching the exhibit an'd affidavit
to this petition is to show that there is additional
evidence of plaintiff's emotional instability of which
defendant was not aware until long afiter the trial.
The exhibit in our opinion is !also pertinent in that
it affe~ts the weight to be given plaintiff's testimony on her alleged grounds for mental cruelty.
In other words, was defendant's conduct the motivating factor in her decision to seek a divorce?
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted tha;t on the law and
the facts, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed, or in the alternative the case returned
for ~a new trial with an order directing the trial
court to permit the defendant to amend his answer
in order to assert an additional defense.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON AND BALDWIN AND
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
Atorneys for Defendant
and Res'pondent
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX "A"
AFFIDAVIT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

ss.

VERNON L. STEVENSON, being first duly
sworn deposes and says: That he is the defendant
in this action; that on August 9, 1961, he discovered
the attached letter (referred to in the Brief asAppendix "B") among the plaintiff's personal effects
left there by her when she left their home and established a separate residence. That he had no prior
knowledge, or information, concerning the relationship between the plaintiff and the writer of the exhibit.
VERNON L. S'TEVENSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this___________ _
day of ------------------------------------------------, 1'962.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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APPENDIX "B"
Sunday 4:30 P.M.
To My Darling GirlFor the past 40 minutes I have 'been fighting
myself with discipline by refusing to phone you.
Elaine is visiting her father - I finished my toil
for today. I have thot of a dozen questions to !ask
you by phone if you are not alone. So I can't stand
it any longer and here I am writing. 'Today, I didn't
dare get near you and Oh how I wan ted to. This
is such a beautiful day to be 'all alone. What a wondeful day to picnic with just you. Darling, I want
you so much and it seems a crime to live this way.
Always wanting but can't do anything about it.
Honey- your note last night referring to my
decision - I didn't want to infer that you were to
make my decision in breaking up 56'78. That I will
do when and if the time is right.
It was grand to be with you last night and see
your wonderful face today. You know, its just leaves
us a 'bit let down when we are not alone - I want
to reach out and kiss and hold you.
Love and make believe kisses
for now ---------------------------------------9:30P.M.
S'ame Day
My Special Sweetheart 23
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No, I never stop thinking of loveable you. I
walk :about the yard- Just keep saying "~Oh, how I
love Dorothy". Drive to Smith's Inn, again, 'I'Oh
how I love Dorothy." Just keeps on going thru my
mind. Again sitting here and listening to "SP."
Bali Hai - '''Come to Me" - '~'You are younger
than Springtime" - Then, I remember the first
day of spring with you - yes, "Love is a grand and
beautiful thing." How many times have a repeated
these words - It just goes on and on - it never
will let up- it becomes more intense- so result
-very lonesome for you on this beautiful evening.
Darling - how can I express more my love for you
and how tender, beautiful, wonderful and lovely
you really are.
Now, "Happy 'Talk" - Talks about things you
like to do" - Our dreams must come true. I am
just crazy for you tonight - I can hardly stand to
live with myself ~alone. I miss you so much tonightGood night - Sweetest Girl of all - I love you.
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